公司治理和资本结构的关系研究

Research on the Relationship between Corporate Governance, Capital Structure and Firm Performance in Developing Economies

作者: 专业:Management Science and Engineering 导师:Qin Yuanjian 年度:2008 学位:博士 

关键词
代理理论 公司管理 发展经济体 中国 公司业绩

Keywords
Agency theory, Corporate Governance, Developing Economies, China, Firm Performance
        公司管理,组织结构和资本结构之间的相互关系,是金融财政学中的一种较低理解范围的知识。尽管之前关于它们的研究在一些发达国家已经完成,但在世界各地的发展中国家、新兴的和转型的国家中,对这些领域涉及甚少。因此,本篇论文试图解决这个在独特组织结构和体制框架中的研究空白,从而帮助企业解释和分析这种复杂的关系。正是由于中国是世界上发展最为迅速的、经济体制最具有鲜明特色的国家,且提供了庞大和生动的经济研究环境,因此本篇论文主要调查了企业资本结构和运作业绩、企业管理和所有制结构等方面对中国的一些上市公司的影响,着重考虑了在世界经济上发挥越来越重要角色的中国经济这一个方面。本篇论文的研究背景,尤其文中的代理理论和数据采集,是基于2001至2005年期间上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易对787非金融类上市公司而作的。在这个研究范例内的公司占在中国证券交易所买卖的非金融公司的投资的百分之95.01,具有一定的普遍性。文章采用了面板数据回归分析等方法,调查并分析其关联中变量的确定,研讨了中国企业的组织管理、所有权、组织结构和其他一些制度。由于公司的所有权和董事会结构,在发展中国家被认为是提高公司治理的关键要素之一,因此这篇论文也有助于中国和世界在企业组织管理上的相互联系与发展,同时,基于论文的结论,还可以建立和制定一些有效的政策。本篇论文在研究过程中发现,中国的上市公司随着所有制的分离而带来了严重的代理问题,这是由于新近的一些经济改革措施造成的。研究的结论表明所有权和董事会结构是对解决或者使代理问题减到最小并且在中国提高公司治理关键要素。通常业绩不好的公司的实践往往建立在相对较高水平组织结构上的,尤其在所有制集中方面,一般都被提高到最佳的结构位置上,从而加重和恶化了公司的整体性能价值以及上市公司性能和评估。在这篇论文的写作研究过程中,最令人关注的是国家所有制结构的影响、国家所有制中的法人制度以及公共持股。国家所有制存在着资本结构和负的相互关系,在中国的上市公司中,政府所有制股权通常创造效率低下并且具有一定的代理问题。反之,法人所有权与其资本结构有关,能影响企业实力的性能。政府所有权对资本结构也有一定的影响。此外,对经验解析的尺度辨别分析也十分重要,大型公司存在资本结构与负的相互关系和与公司存在着确定的相互关系。宏观调控过度的公司对公司产生的负的影响运作较大。此外,有效的中国董事会组织结构,可以作为一个有用的公司治理机制,以确保投资者的回报。调查结果显示,相关联系建立在公司的董事局和上市公司之间。由于拥有各种不同的专业知识,成员之间有更好的决策能力。与此相反,董事会的技能和董事会组成(外部董事)都被查出呈正相关联系,与业绩呈负相关联系,其中外部董事拥有足够的技巧,以监测和控制管理人员。这一论断提供了证据表明,中国上市公司自开放改革始于上世纪70年代末的董事会结构,可以作为公司治理机制,以解决或减少代理问题。另一项重要发现是资本结构与公司绩效的相互作用。资本结构所具有正、负关系与表现在很大程度上取决于企业对经营目的和良好的运作之间的平衡作用。在另一方面。中国上市公司的资本结构与中国公司业绩之间具有一个显着的负相关联系。研究表明,中国企业的融资来自外部的、短期债务和长期的资金与股票发行,构成了最大的外部资金来源。实证结果表明,税收,破产成本,代理成本和信息成本,是中国公司的资本结构决策很重要的因素。研究结果显示,企业资本结构的调整来自平衡跌幅与获利能力、成长机会、非债务避税、企业规模、资产结构和税率征收企业所得税。值得关注的是,研究表明中国上市公司主要是短期平衡性质的基础,贸易起飞和代理成本理论是重要的影响因素。实证分析表明,在中国,对金融结构与性能的公开上市公司的所有权和控制机制有重大影响。政府作为大股东和借贷的担保可以达到杠杠平衡情况。同时,由于政府管制和调控,无论是贷款和借款企业。测算结果表明,代理问题都可能不太严重,其持股其他投资者尤其是私人股东。如果该国在其各个层次的都由国家占了很大的比例,可以出售其控股通过其私有化计划。
    The correlation between corporate governance, ownership structure and capital structure is one of the less understood areas within the finance Literature. Although previous studies have been done in these areas of research particularly in the advanced countries, very little is known about it in developing, emerging and transitional countries around the world. Thus, this study attempts to address this research gap within a unique organizational and institutional framework that may help explain the intricacies of such a relationship. The study therefore investigates the impact of corporate governance and ownership structure on corporate capital structure and its consequential effects on the performance of publicly listed firms in China. As the most rapidly developing economy in the world with distinctive characteristics, China provides a large and dynamic environment in which to investigate this subject.This study has its background on the agency theory and the data sample is based on 787 non-financial companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period 2001 to 2005. The study employed the panel data regression analysis to investigate possible link among the variables identified. The study found publicly listed firms in China to have serious agency problems ensuing from the separation of ownership and control, as a result of the recent economic reforms. Generally, poor corporate governance practice was found to create room for relatively high levels of leverage in capital structure and exacerbate the performance and value of the firms.In this study, perhaps the most interesting and striking findings are the influence of ownership structure such as state, Legal Person (institutional) and public holdings on capital structure and firm performance. State ownership was found to have a positive correlation with capital structure and negative association with firm performance. On the contrary, the Legal Person ownership was found to have a negative bearing on listed capital structure. Also, Legal Person holdings were found to influence firm performance positively. Public ownership was found to have influence on capital structure. Other issue identified in the empirical analysis is that ownership concentration was found to enhance optimal capital structure though the results are not significant. This variable was found too to also enhance listed firm performance and valuation. Ownership concentration was found to enhance optimal capital structure though the results are not significant. This variable was found to also enhance listed firm performance and valuation.Furthermore, the findings suggest that there is a correlation between the characteristics of a firm’s board of directors and the capital structure and performance of firms. In particular, board size is found to have a negative association with leverage on the one hand, and on the other hand, a positive relationship with performance. The relationship between board size and performance explains that larger boards have a range of expertise among members and have better decision making ability. On the contrary, board skill and board composition (outside directors) are found to be positively correlated with performance and negatively associated with leverage, which explains the ability of outside directors with adequate skill to monitor and control managers in the use of debt while improving on performance. It is evident from this study that board structure can serve as a governance mechanism to reduce agency problem that is conspicuous among Chinese listed firms since the opening up reforms that began late 1970s.Another significant finding is the interaction between capital structure and firm performance. Capital structure is found to have positive and negative relationship with performance though this largely depends on the purpose and well utilization of leverage. On the other hand, firm performance was found to have a significantly and negatively correlation with corporate capital structure of publicly listed firms in China. Of the determinants of corporate capital structures, the findings indicate that leverage decreases with profitability, growth opportunities, and non-debt-tax-shield, but increases with firm size, assets structure and corporate income tax rate. Interestingly, the study showed listed firms in China to correspond mainly to short-term leverage nature on rollover basis. The pecking-order, trade-off and agency cost theories are found to be relevant in explaining the factors influencing capital structure decisions of publicly listed firms in China.The findings indicate that agency problem may be less severe if the state, at its various levels, can divest its holdings through a guided privatization program in which the state gives up a large proportion of its holdings to other investors especially the private shareholder.
        

公司治理和资本结构的关系研究

摘要4-6
ABSTRACT6-7
Dedication8-9
Table of Contents9-14
List of Figures14-15
List of Tables15-17
Chapter 1 Introduction17-37
    1.1. Background of the Study17-25
        1.1.1 The Concepts of Corporate Governance21-25
    1.2. Research Purpose and Significance25-31
        1.2.1 Statement of the Problem25-28
        1.2.2 Objectives of the Study28-29
        1.2.3 Contribution of the Study29-31
    1.3 Theoretical Background: An Agency Perspective31-36
    1.4 Structure of the Thesis36-37
Chapter 2 Literature Review of Corporate governance, Ownership and Corporate Capital Structures and Firm Performance37-78
    2.1. Introduction37-38
    2.2 Alternative Approaches to Corporate Governance38-43
        2.2.1 The Stewardship Theory39-40
        2.2.2 The Stakeholder Approach40-42
        2.2.3 An Institutional Perspective42-43
    2.3 Corporate Governance Systems in Practice43-58
        2.3.1 The Anglo-American Corporate Governance System44-49
        2.3.2 The German (Continental European) Corporate Governance System49-52
        2.3.3 The Japanese Corporate Governance System52-54
        2.3.5 The Transitional Economies Corporate Governance Systems54-58
    2.4 Corporate Governance Mechanisms58-78
        2.4.1 Ownership Structures61-69
            2.4.1.1 Ownership Concentration63-66
            2.4.1.2 Managerial Share Ownership66-69
        2.4.2 Board Structure69-76
            2.4.2.1 Board Size70-71
            2.4.2.2 CEO Duality71-73
            2.4.2.3 Board Composition (Outside Directors)73-76
        2.4.3 Managerial Incentives and Compensation76-78
Chapter 3 The Pattern of Corporate Governance in China78-123
    3.1 Introduction78-79
    3.2 Corporate Governance and Economic System Reforms in China79-95
        3.2.1 Corporate Governance and Stages of Reforms in China79-82
        3.2.2 The Reform of Chinese State Owned Enterprises82-85
        3.3.3 The China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC)85-88
        3.3.4 China's Stock Market Development and Enterprise Listing Process88-92
        3.3.5 Categories of Shares in China's Listed Firms92-95
    3.4 Ownership and Control in China95-123
        3.4.1 Chinese Ownership Structures95-107
            3.4.1.1 Ownership Concentration100-102
            3.4.1.2 Institutional Ownership102-103
            3.4.1.3 State Ownership103-105
            3.4.1.4 Insider Ownership105-106
            3.4.1.5 Foreign Ownership106-107
        3.4.2 The Shareholders' General Meeting (SGM)107-108
        3.4.3 Board of Directors in China108-117
            3.4.3.1 Composition of the Chinese Boards110-116
            3.4.3.2 The Supervisory Committee116-117
        3.4.4 Managerial Compensations in China117-121
        3.4.5 External Corporate Governance Mechanisms121-123
Chapter 4 Capital Structure and Firm Performance123-141
    4.1. Introduction123-124
    4.2 Capital Structure Theories124-128
        4.2.1 The Static Tradeoff Theory125-126
        4.2.2 The Pecking Order Theory126-127
        4.2.3 The Agency Cost Theory127-128
    4.3 Determinants of Capital Structure in China128-139
        4.3.1 Profitability128-130
        4.3.2 Asset Structure130-132
        4.3.3 Firm's Size132-133
        4.3.4 Firm's Age133-134
        4.3.5 Growth Opportunities134-135
        4.3.6 Firms'Volatility135-136
        4.3.7 Non-Debt Tax Shields136-137
        4.3.8 Ownership Structure and Insider Shareholdings137-138
        4.3.9 Industry Classification138-139
    4.4 Capital Structure and Firm Performance in China139-141
Chapter 5 Sample, Hypotheses, Methodology and Variables141-169
    5.1 Introduction141
    5.2 Data and Sample of the study141-146
        5.2.1 Sample of the study141-144
        5.2.2 Data Source144-146
    5.3 Research Methodology146-148
    5.4 Hypotheses for Verification and Model148-158
        5.4.1 Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure on Capital Structure and Firm Performance148-152
        5.4.2. Ownership Concentration, Capital Structure and Firm Performance152-154
        5.4.3. Board Structure, Corporate Capital Structure and Firm Performance154-156
        5.4.4 Corporate Capital Structure and Firm Performance156-157
        5.4.5 Determinants of Corporate Capital Structure157-158
            5.4.5.1 Model Specifications157-158
    5.5 Definition of Some key Variables158-169
        5.5.1 Dependent Variables158-161
        5.5.2 Independent Variables161-163
        5.5.3 Other Variables163-169
Chapter 6 Data Analyses, Results and Discussion169-219
    6.1 Introduction169
    6.2 Descriptive Statistics for Corporate Governance Sample169-173
    6.3 Empirical Results173-219
        6.3.1 Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure on Capital Structure173-180
        6.3.2 The Effect of Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure on Firm erformance180-187
        6.3.3 Ownership Concentration on Capital Structure and Firm Performance187-192
        6.3.4 Board Structure on Corporate Capital Structurem Performance192-198
        6.3.5 The Effect of Board Structure on Firm Performance and Valuation198-205
        6.3.6 Corporate Capital Structure and Firm Performance in China205-209
        6.3.7. The Determinants of Corporate Capital Structure in China209-219
            6.3.7.1 Empirical Results of the determinants of capital structure212-219
Chapter 7 Conclusion and Future Research219-226
    7.1 Introduction219-221
    7.2 Contributions221-222
    7.3 Directions for Future Research222-223
    7.4 Limitations to the Study223-225
    7.5 Conclusion225-226
References226-243
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS243-244
Appendices244-252


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